1 THE HONORABLE SEAN O'DONNELL KING COUNTY WASHINGTON Noted for Consideration: March 18, 2016 2 ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED MAY 272016 SUPERIOR COURT CLERK 3 BY Susan Bone DEPUTY 4 5 6 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 7 FOR THE COUNTY OF KING 8 Case No. 14-2-07669-0 SEA MOVE, INC., a Delaware corporation, 9 REALSELECT, INC., a Delaware corporation, TOP PRODUCER SYSTEMS **TPROPOSED** ORDER DENYING COMPANY, a British Columbia unlimited DEFENDANT CURT BEARDSLEY'S 10 liability company, NATIONAL MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS®, an JUDGMENT ON TRULIA CLAIMS AMI 11 Illinois non-profit corporation, and BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY REALTORS® INFORMATION 12 NETWORK, INC., an Illinois corporation, 13 Plaintiffs, 14 VS. ZILLOW, INC., a Washington corporation, 15 ERROL SAMUELSON, an individual, and CURT BEARDSLEY, an individual, and 16 DOES 1-20, 17 Defendants. 18 19 20 21

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THIS MATTER came before the Court on Defendant Curt Beardsley's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On Trulia Claims ("the Motion"). The Court has reviewed the filings in support of and in opposition to the Motion, and has heard oral argument from counsel, and deems itself fully advised.

Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. *Trimble v. Wash. State Univ.*, 140 Wn. 2d 88, 93 (2000); CR 56. In ruling on a summary judgment motion, "[a]ll facts submitted and all reasonable inferences from them are to be considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." *Trimble*, 140 Wn. 2d at 93. The motion should be granted "only if, from all the evidence, reasonable persons could reach *but one* conclusion." *Id.* (emphasis added). Here Beardsley fails to meet his burden, and for the reasons set forth below, the Motion is DENIED.

Beardsley's first argument is that this Court should treat Beardsley separately from the other Defendants. However, Plaintiffs have put forward sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact regarding whether a conspiracy between Beardsley and the other Defendants exists. For example, Plaintiffs have introduced evidence that Samuelson and Beardsley began investigating how to kill ListHub in October 2013, and that by November 2013 they were plotting to join Move's chief rival Zillow. While Beardsley claims that he personally did not know information about the Move/Trulia merger, so he cannot be liable for its misappropriation, if the jury were to find the existence of a conspiracy, Beardsley will be liable for any act of trade secret misappropriation perpetrated by one of his co-conspirators, even if he did not commit the act himself. See Sterling Business Forms, Inc. v. Thorpe, 82 Wn.App. 446, 454, 918 P.2d 531 (1996). Accordingly, the Motion must be denied on this basis.

Second, Beardsley argues that he did not know any trade secret information about the Move/Trulia merger discussions because Move did not share that information with him, precluding Plaintiffs' misappropriation claims. However, Plaintiffs have put forward evidence

from which a reasonable juror could conclude that he knew about the Move/Trulia merger opportunity and misappropriated that knowledge. For example, Samuelson emailed Beardsley the letter he was sending to Rascoff in which Plaintiffs allege Zillow was tipped off to the Move/Trulia merger negotiations. Beardsley read the letter, responded to it twice, and told Samuelson that Rascoff would "get the inference." Even if this were all that Beardsley knew about the Move/Trulia merger, a reasonable juror could infer that he knew enough to "get the inference" that a Move/Trulia merger was in the works, he knew without a doubt that Samuelson was going to share the information with Rascoff, and he knew that doing so "certainly could impact Zillow's valuation in the near term." Plaintiffs have also identified a number of other facts indicating Beardsley took steps to impact Move's steps with Trulia regarding a merger. Plaintiffs have introduced sufficient evidence that Beardsley misappropriated Move trade secrets relating to the Move/Trulia to create a triable issue of fact.

Even if Beardsley's knowledge of the Move/Trulia merger talks was limited, Beardsley had other trade secret information and Plaintiffs have put forward facts showing he used that information to harm them. Beardsley knew how significant ListHub was to Move and to its plans to build a new industry platform. He also knew that attacking Move's metrics was the way to kill ListHub; he had even written about that in his Attack ListHub memo, and he knew that disrupting the relationship between ListHub and Trulia would be an effective way to damage ListHub's metrics. A reasonable juror could conclude that Beardsley's intent was to (1) carry out his "attack ListHub" plan to torpedo Move's industry platform strategy; (2) prevent the Move/Trulia merger by dissuading Trulia from further collaboration with ListHub; (3) begin convincing Trulia that collaboration with Zillow was a better option; or (4) all of the above. Further, a reasonable juror could conclude that Beardsley's actions contributed to the loss of the Move/Trulia merger by tainting the two companies' eollaboration efforts: Hence, a genuine

issue of material fact exists as to Beardsley's liability for the loss of the Move/Trulia merger opportunity.

Beardsley's argument in favor of summary judgment on Plaintiffs' breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty claims fails as Beardsley's only argument is that Plaintiffs have not found any evidence of his knowledge of information regarding the Trulia-Move discussions.

However, as discussed above, Plaintiffs have put forth evidence that Beardsley did have information about the Move/Trulia merger opportunity, and Beardsley owed Moved a fiduciary duty. Accordingly, dismissal of the breach of contract claim and the breach of fiduciary duty claim are also denied.

To the extent Beardsley claims that Plaintiffs may not properly rely on circumstantial evidence to support their claims, he is incorrect.

Plaintiffs in trade secret cases...are confronted with an extraordinarily difficult task. Misappropriation and misuse can rarely be proved by convincing direct evidence. In most cases plaintiffs must construct a web of perhaps ambiguous circumstantial evidence from which the trier of fact may draw inferences which convince him that it is more probable than not that what the plaintiffs allege happened did in fact take place. Against this often delicate construct of circumstantial evidence there frequently must be balanced defendants' witnesses who directly deny everything.

SI Handling Systems, Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1261 (3d Cir. 1985); see also Washington Pattern Jury Instruction 1.03 ("The law does not distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence in terms of their weight or value."). In light of the reality that trade secret misappropriation is often covert, "a plaintiff may establish misappropriation of a trade secret with circumstantial evidence that shows access to similar information." USA Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp, 235 P.3d 749, 761 (Utah 2010) (collecting cases from Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Federal Circuits). Plaintiffs have introduced enough circumstantial evidence to create a material issue of fact. For example, Plaintiffs have introduced evidence that at the time of the tip-off, Samuelson and Beardsley had already begun avoiding a paper trail, explicitly for the purpose of making it difficult for anyone to argue they were working against

Move. A reasonable juror could infer from this	that they were working against Move, and
accordingly, this issue must be reserved for the	jury.
Finally, the Court notes that Defendants	— including Beardsley himself—have destroyed a-
large amount of evidence related to the underlying the same of the	ing facts of this case. The impact of that evidence
chirely inappropriate, in the context of the bro	studio for pupils of the motion bad evidence destruction by Defendants, to grant
summary judgment in favor of those same Defe	ndants.
NOW THEREFORE, it is ORDERED th	hat the Motion is DENIED.
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JENNER & BLOCK LLP	GORDON TILDEN THOMAS &
Attorneys for Plaintiffs	CORDELL LLP Attorneys for Plaintiffs
By s/Brent Caslin	By s/Mike Rosenberger
Richard L. Stone (pro hac vice) Brent Caslin, WSBA #36145 David Singer (pro hac vice)	Jeffrey M. Thomas, WSBA #21175 Mike Rosenberger, WSBA # 17730 Mark Wilner, WSBA #31550
633 West Fifth Street, Suite 3600	1001 Fourth Avenue, Suite 4000 Seattle, Washington 98154
T: 213-239-5100	T: 206-467-6477 F: 206-467-6292
I E. 212 520 5100	
F: 213-539-5199 E: rstone@jenner.com F: bcaslin@ienner.com	E: jthomas@gordontilden.com
	D 24 0 1 491
E: rstone@jenner.com	E: jthomas@gordontilden.com
	accordingly, this issue must be reserved for the Finally, the Court notes that Defendants large amount of evidence related to the underly this is a county of evidence related to the underly destruction is being considered in connection we also in the sense of the broad inappropriate, in the context of the broad summary judgment in favor of those same Defendants. NOW THEREFORE, it is ORDERED to THE HON Presented by: JENNER & BLOCK LLP Attorneys for Plaintiffs By s/Brent Caslin Richard L. Stone (pro hac vice) Brent Caslin, WSBA #36145 David Singer (pro hac vice) 633 West Fifth Street, Suite 3600 Los Angeles, California 90071 T: 213-239-5100

1	CABLE, LANGENBACH, KINERK & BAUER LLP
2	Attorneys for Plaintiffs
3	By s/Jack Lovejoy
4	Jack M. Lovejoy, WSBA #36962 1000 Second Avenue Bldg., Suite 3500
5	Seattle, Washington 98104 T: 206-292-8800
6	F: 206-292-0494 E: <u>jlovejoy@cablelang.com</u>
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